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Abstract. Cloud users (clients) with limited storage capacity at their end can outsource bulk data
to the cloud storage server. A client can later access her data by downloading the required data files.
However, a large fraction of the data files the client outsources to the server is often archival in nature
that the client uses for backup purposes and accesses less frequently. An untrusted server can thus
delete some of these archival data files in order to save some space (and allocate the same to other
clients) without being detected by the client (data owner). Proofs of storage enable the client to audit
her data files uploaded to the server in order to ensure the integrity of those files. In this work, we
introduce a type of (selective) proofs of storage that we call keyword-based delegable proofs of storage,
where the client wants to audit all her data files containing a specific keyword (e.g., “important”).
Moreover, it satisfies the notion of public verifiability where the client can delegate the auditing task
to a third-party auditor who audits the set of files corresponding to the keyword on behalf of the
client. We formally define the security of a keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol. We
construct such a protocol based on an existing proof-of-storage scheme and analyze the security of
our protocol. We argue that the techniques we use can be applied atop any existing publicly verifiable
proof-of-storage scheme for static data. Finally, we discuss the efficiency of our construction.
Keywords: Cryptographic protocols, proofs of storage, cloud computing, keyword-based audits, pub-
lic verifiability
1 Introduction
Cloud computing platform provides a robust infrastructure to the cloud users (clients) in order
to enable them storing large amount of data on cloud servers. The clients can access their data
as often as needed by downloading them from the cloud servers. Several storage service providers
like Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3), Microsoft OneDrive, Dropbox and Google Drive offer
storage outsourcing facility to their clients (data owners). The clients pay these providers for the
service and expect that their (untampered) data can be retrieved at any point of time. However,
a client’s data can be lost due to the failure of some of the storage nodes or due to a malicious
activity of the cloud server (an untrusted server can delete some part of the client’s data in order
to save some space). Therefore, the client needs an assurance that her data files are stored by the
server intact. A possible cryptographic solution of the above problem is that the client computes
an authenticator (tag) on a data file. Then, she uploads the file and the tag to the server. To check
the integrity of the data file, the client downloads the file and the tag, and she checks if the file
has been modified. However, this solution is inefficient in practice due to the large communication
bandwidth required between the client and the cloud server.
Proofs of storage provide an efficient mechanism to check the availability of the client’s data
outsourced to a remote storage server. In a proof-of-storage protocol, the client can audit her
⋆ A preliminary version of this work has been published in International Conference on Information Security
Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2018) (available at link.springer.com).
data file stored on the server without accessing the whole file, and still, be able to detect an un-
wanted modification of the file done by the (possibly malicious) server. Proof-of-storage protocols
can be typically classified as: provable data possession (PDP) protocols [2,13,31] and proof-of-
retrievability (POR) protocols [17,9,27]. In these schemes, the client computes an authentication
tag for each segment of her data file and uploads the file along with these authentication tags.
Later, the client audits the data file via spot-checking, where the client verifies the integrity of
only a predefined number of randomly sampled segments of the file. We note that PDP schemes
provide the guarantee of retrievability of almost all segments of the data file. On the other hand,
all segments of the file can be retrieved in POR schemes. These schemes are designed for dynamic
or static data depending on whether the client can change the content of her data file after the ini-
tial outsourcing. Some of these schemes are publicly verifiable where anyone with an access to the
public parameters can perform audits. In case of privately verifiable schemes, only the client (data
owner) with some secret information can perform audits. In a publicly verifiable proof-of-storage
scheme, the client can delegate the auditing task to a third-party auditor (TPA) who performs
audits on the client’s data and lets the client know if she finds any discrepancies.
The client often has a large repository of data files (documents), and she classifies these
documents for performing different types of analyses on them later. Document-clustering is a
popular technique where the data owner groups her data files depending on some attributes of the
files. Keyword-based document-clustering is one of the examples of document-clustering where the
clusters are formed based on the distinct keywords present in the data files [18,10]. It has various
applications in data mining and information retrieval such as designing an efficient scheme for
searching over these data files [28,29]. Similarly, in a proof-of-storage protocol for such a clustered
file repository, the client (data owner) might need different degrees of availability-assurance for
different outsourced files based on the keywords they contain. Obviously, the client can check
integrity of all the data files she has uploaded to the cloud server. However, the cloud server can
charge the client for the associated (computational and bandwidth) cost involved in an audit (this
cost is wasted in case the server is storing the client’s data properly). Typically, the more files are
audited by the client, the higher is this associated cost. Thus, the client might want to run audits
only on important files having some specific keywords. For example, the guarantee of availability
for the files containing the keyword “important” might be of higher priority rather than that for
the files containing the keyword “movie”. In this scenario, there must be some mechanism such
that the client can efficiently check the integrity of all of her data files (uploaded to the server)
that contain a particular keyword.
We note that there exist many searchable encryption schemes [11,8,7] in the literature that
address efficient keyword-search over encrypted data files stored on a remote server. These schemes
can be potentially integrated with existing proof-of-storage schemes to audit the set of data files
matching a particular keyword. However, these searchable encryption schemes aim to minimize
the information regarding the encrypted files that is leaked to the (typically) semi-honest remote
server (that follows the protocol honestly but tries to learn some information regarding the content
of the files or the keywords being searched). On the other hand, the untrusted server in proof-of-
storage schemes is considered to be malicious (i.e., it can corrupt the client’s data in an arbitrary
fashion). Moreover, the definition of a proof-of-storage scheme does not demand encrypting the
data files or hiding the search (or access) patterns during a keyword-search (which involves storage
and computational overhead).
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Our Contribution We summarize our contributions in this paper as follows.
– We introduce the notion of keyword-based delegable proofs of storage, where the client can
audit all her outsourced data files that contain a specific keyword (keyword-based audits).
Moreover, any third-party auditor with the knowledge of some public parameters can perform
audits on the set of files corresponding to the keyword on behalf of the client.
– We formalize the security model for a keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol and
define the security for such a protocol.
– We construct a keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol based on an existing publicly
verifiable proof-of-storage scheme and analyze the security of our protocol. We describe a non-
interactive challenge-generation method for keyword-based audits in our construction, where
the verifier does not know a priori the set of files matching a particular keyword. Our techniques
can be used with any existing publicly verifiable proof-of-storage scheme for static data in order
to enable keyword-based audits.
– We describe the efficiency of our keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some preliminaries and
background related to our work. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of keyword-based delegable
proofs of storage (KDPoS) and discuss some possible constructions of a keyword-based delegable
proof-of-storage protocol. In Section 4, we propose a concrete KDPoS construction. We define the
security of a KDPoS scheme and analyze the security of our scheme in Section 5. In Section 6, we
discuss the efficiency of our KDPoS scheme. In the concluding Section 7, we summarize the work
done in this paper.
2 Preliminaries and Background
2.1 Notation
Let λ be the security parameter. An algorithm A(1λ) is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
when its running time is polynomial in λ and its output is a random variable that depends on
the internal coin tosses of A. An element a chosen from a set S uniformly at random is denoted
as a
R
←− S. A function f : N → R is called negligible in λ if for all positive integers c and for
all sufficiently large λ, we have f(λ) < 1
λc
. The notation ‘·|| · · · ||·’ denotes the concatenation of
multiple strings. For two integers a and b (where a ≤ b), the set {a, a + 1, . . . , b} is denoted by
[a, b] as well.
2.2 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2 and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p = Θ(2
2λ). Let g1 and g2
be generators of the groups G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear map [19,20,14] is a function
e : G1 ×G2 → GT such that:
1. for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(u
a, vb) = e(u, v)ab (bilinear property),
2. e is non-degenerate, that is, e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
Furthermore, properties 1 and 2 imply that
3. for all u1, u2 ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, we have e(u1 · u2, v) = e(u1, v) · e(u2, v).
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If G1 = G2 = G, the bilinear map is symmetric; otherwise, it is asymmetric. Unless other-
wise mentioned, we consider bilinear maps which are symmetric and efficiently computable. Let
BLSetup(1λ) be an algorithm which outputs (p, g,G,GT , e), the parameters of a bilinear map,
where g is a generator of G (i.e., G = 〈g〉).
2.3 Discrete Logarithm Assumption
The discrete logarithm problem over a multiplicative group G = 〈g〉 of prime order p and generated
by g is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Given g, h ∈ G, the discrete logarithm problem
over G is to compute a ∈ Zp such that h = g
a.
We say that the discrete logarithm assumption holds in G if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A(1λ), the probability
Pr
a
R
←−Zp
[a← A(g, h) : h = ga]
is negligible in λ, where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of A and the random
choices of a.
2.4 Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The computational Diffie-Hellman problem over a multiplicative group G = 〈g〉 of prime order p
and generated by g is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem). Given g, ga, h = gb ∈ G for some
a, b ∈ Zp, the computational Diffie-Hellman problem over G is to compute h
a ∈ G.
We say that the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the group G if, for any prob-
abilistic polynomial-time adversary A(1λ), the probability
Pr
a,b
R
←−Zp
[ha ← A(g, ga, h = gb)]
is negligible in λ, where the probability is taken over the internal coin tosses of A and the random
choices of a and b. We note that the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in G
implies the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in G.
2.5 Erasure Codes
A (m˜, n˜, d)Σ -erasure code is an error-correcting code [21] that comprises an encoding algorithm
Enc: Σn˜ → Σm˜ (encodes a message consisting of n˜ symbols into a longer codeword consisting of m˜
symbols) and a decoding algorithm Dec: Σm˜ → Σn˜ (decodes a codeword to a message), where Σ
is a finite alphabet and d is the minimum distance (Hamming distance between any two codewords
is at least d) of the code. The quantity n˜
m˜
is called the rate of the code. A (m˜, n˜, d)Σ-erasure code
can tolerate up to d−1 erasures. If d = m˜− n˜+1, we call the code a maximum distance separable
(MDS) code. For a (m˜, n˜)-MDS code, the original message can be reconstructed from any n˜ out
of m˜ symbols of the codeword. Reed-Solomon codes [24] and their extensions are examples of
non-trivial MDS codes.
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2.6 Bitcoin
Nakamoto introduces a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency known as Bitcoin [23] that does not rely
on any trusted server. The users in the Bitcoin network make payments by digitally signing
transactions with their secret keys. The network maintains a blockchain (a public ledger containing
valid transactions) in a distributed fashion. A new block is appended to the Bitcoin blockchain
roughly in every 10 minutes (an epoch). These blocks are generated by the miners (users trying
to mine Bitcoins) in the network who provide a cryptographic proof-of-work to show, in order to
claim a mining reward, that they have indeed expended a large amount of computational power.
Presently, Bitcoin uses Back’s Hashcash [3] as the proof-of-work. The mining scheme in Bitcoin
involves solving a cryptographic mining puzzle that is not precomputable. Finding a solution of
the puzzle works in the following way: Let T1, T2, . . . , Tz be some of the valid transactions for a
certain epoch which are not included in any previous block. The miners try to find a nonce η
such that SHA-256(BH||rootMHT ||η) ≤ Z, where Z is a predefined target value (the difficulty
level), BH is the hash of the latest block appended to the Bitcoin blockchain and rootMHT is
the root-digest of the Merkle hash tree built over T1, T2, . . . , Tz . Due to the preimage-resistance
property of SHA-256, the only way to compute such a nonce η is to search over all possible values
of the nonce in a brute-force manner.
2.7 Digital Signatures
A digital signature scheme [15] consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms: a key gen-
eration algorithm KeyGen, a signing algorithm Sign and a verification algorithm Verify. KeyGen
takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a pair of keys (psk, ssk), where ssk is the
secret key and psk is the corresponding public verification key. The algorithm Sign takes a mes-
sage m from the message space M and the secret key ssk as input and outputs a signature σ.
The algorithm Verify takes as input the public key psk, a message m and a signature σ, and
outputs accept or reject depending upon whether the signature is valid or not. Any of these
algorithms can be probabilistic in nature. The correctness and security (existential unforgeability
under adaptive chosen message attacks [15]) of a digital signature scheme are described as follows.
1. Correctness: Algorithm Verify always accepts a signature generated by an honest signer, that
is,
Pr[Verify(psk,m,Sign(ssk,m)) = accept] = 1.
2. Security : Let Signssk(·) be the signing oracle and A be any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary with an oracle access to Signssk(·). The adversary A adaptively makes polynomial
(in λ) number of sign queries to Signssk(·) for different messages and gets back the signatures
on those messages. The signature scheme is secure if A cannot produce, except with some
probability negligible in λ, a valid signature on a message not queried previously, that is, for
any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary ASignssk(·), the following probability
Pr[(m,σ)← ASignssk(·)(psk) : m 6∈ Qs ∧Verify(psk,m, σ) = accept]
is negligible in λ, where Qs is the set of queries made by A to Signssk(·).
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2.8 Proofs of Storage
Proofs of storage provide a client (data owner) with an efficient mechanism to verify the integrity
of her data outsourced to a remote cloud server. Ateniese et al. [2] introduce the notion of provable
data possession (PDP) where the client computes an authentication tag for each segment of her
data file and uploads the file along with these tags. During an audit, the client verifies the integrity
of the data file via spot-checking where she samples l = O(λ) random segment-indices (challenge)
and sends them to the server. The server generates a proof based on the challenged segments
(and their corresponding tags) and sends the proof (response) to the client who verifies the proof.
This scheme also introduces the notion of “public verifiability” where the client can delegate the
auditing task to a third-party auditor (TPA) who performs audits on the client’s behalf. For a
“privately verifiable” scheme, only the client with some secret information can perform an audit.
Other schemes achieving PDP include [13,31,30,16].
Juels and Kaliski [17] introduce the notion of proofs of retrievability (POR) for static data.
The underlying idea of a proof-of-retrievability scheme is to encode the original file with an erasure
code (see Section 2.5), authenticate the segments of the encoded file, and then upload them on the
cloud storage server [26]. Due to the encoding, the server has to delete a large number of segments
to actually delete a file-segment, and this can be detected by the client with high probability. This
ensures that all segments of the file are retrievable from the responses of the server which passes
audits with some non-negligible probability. Other POR schemes include [6,12,32,9,27].
3 Keyword-Based Delegable Proofs of Storage
In this section, we introduce the notion of keyword-based delegable proofs of storage and describe
some possible constructions. We define a keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol as
follows.
Definition 3. A keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol (KDPoS) consists of the fol-
lowing procedures.
– Setup(1λ): The client runs this algorithm which sets the parameters of the protocol and gen-
erates a secret key-public key pair K = (sk, pk) for the client.
– Outsource(F¯ , sk, fid): Given a set of data files F¯ associated with a set of random file-identifiers
fid, the client processes F¯ to form another set of files F¯ ′ (including respective authentication
information computed using sk) and uploads F¯ ′ to the server. The client stores some metadata
d¯ corresponding to F¯ ′ at her end.
– AuthRead(j, F¯ ′, d¯, pk, fid):When the client wants to read the j-th block of a file F ′ identified by
fid, the server sends to the client F ′[j], the j-th block of the file, along with the corresponding
proof Π(j).
– VerifyRead(j, d¯, pk, sk, F ′[j],Π(j), fid): After receiving (F ′[j],Π(j)) from the server, the client
checks the validity of Π(j). The client outputs 1 if Π(j) is a valid proof for F ′[j]; she outputs
0, otherwise.
– SChallenge(pk, l, d¯, f˜id): During an audit on a set of files identified by f˜id ⊆ fid, the verifier1
sends the set f˜id and a random challenge set Q of cardinality l = O(λ) to the server.
1 The verifier can be a third-party auditor (TPA) or the client (data owner) herself. In case the verifier is a TPA,
the client shares the metadata d¯ with the TPA.
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– SProve(Q, pk, l, F¯ ′, f˜id): Given the challenge set Q and a set of files identified by f˜id, the
server computes a proof of storage T corresponding to the challenge set Q and sends T to the
verifier.
– SVerify(Q,T, pk, l, d¯, f˜id): The verifier checks whether T is a valid proof of storage correspond-
ing to the challenge set Q. The verifier outputs 1 if the proof passes the verification; she outputs
0, otherwise.
– KChallenge(pk, l, w, d¯): During a keyword-based audit on the files containing a given keyword
w, the verifier generates a token tw and a challenge set Q. The verifier sends Q along with
the token tw to the server.
– KProve(Q, pk, l, F¯ ′, tw): Upon receiving the challenge set Q, the server computes a proof of
storage T corresponding to all the data files containing the keyword w and sends T to the
verifier.
– KVerify(Q,T, pk, l, tw, d¯): The verifier checks whether T is a valid proof of storage correspond-
ing to the challenge set Q. The verifier outputs 1 if the proof passes the verification; she outputs
0, otherwise.
We note that we have added two extra functionalities over a basic publicly verifiable proof-of-
storage protocol for static data: file-identifier-based audits (audits on a set of files) and keyword-
based audits. Definition 3 implicitly includes a “regular” audit on a single data file associated
with an identifier fid, where f˜id contains only the file-identifier fid. A file-identifier-based audit
consists of the procedures SChallenge, SProve and SVerify; a keyword-based audit consists of the
procedures KChallenge, KProve and KVerify. An authenticated read comprises the procedures
AuthRead and VerifyRead.
In order to perform a keyword-based audit for a particular keyword w, there are two options
that the client can adopt. First, the client identifies the set (say, Fw) of files containing w correctly
and runs a proof-of-storage protocol on these files. Second, the client sends to the server the
keyword w so that the server can identify the corresponding files itself and generate responses
during an audit properly. From the security point of view, the client must be assured of the
following guarantees.
1. The integrity of the files outsourced to the (possibly malicious) server should be maintained,
be it verified via file-identifier-based audits or via keyword-based audits.
2. For keyword-based audits, audits must be performed on all the files containing the challenged
keyword w (e.g., the server cannot cheat by sending proofs of storage for a set F ′w ( Fw or by
sending proofs of storage for a set F ′w 6⊂ Fw).
Towards providing a framework of a keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol, we de-
scribe briefly a series of possible constructions and highlight some issues regarding each of these
constructions.
3.1 A Naive Approach
The client builds an inverted index I on the set of files F¯ . A simple inverted index I stores, for
each keyword, a list of identifiers of all the files containing the keyword. The client splits each
(possibly encoded) file F ∈ F¯ into segments and generates authentication tags on the segments
using a secret key. She stores the inverted index I at her end and uploads the files (and the tags)
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to the server. During an audit for a keyword w, she consults I in order to get the identifiers of all
files that contain w. With these file-identifiers known, the client (or a TPA) can perform audits on
the corresponding files and check their integrity. However, this solution is not suitable for clients
having low storage capacity (e.g., clients using low end mobile devices) as the inverted index can
be large (of the order of tens/hundreds of Gigabytes [7]) compared to the storage available at the
client’s side.
3.2 Outsourcing Inverted Index to Storage Server
To overcome the shortcomings of the naive solution, one possibility is to outsource the inverted
index I itself to the untrusted (malicious) storage server. This enables the storage server to
compute the responses given a keyword w. Now, for a keyword-based audit, the verifier (the client
herself or a TPA) sends the keyword w along with a random challenge set Q to the server. The
server searches in I for the identifiers of all files containing the specific keyword w, computes a
proof of storage for these files using Q and sends the proof to the verifier (client or TPA). However,
the storage server in our security model (and in most of the existing proof-of-storage protocols)
is considered to be malicious, and it can delete a client’s data in order to utilize the space thus
gained to store other clients’ data (e.g., the server can actually store only 1,000 out of 10,000 files
containing a particular keyword). To be precise, there must be some mechanism for the verifier
to check that: 1) the server is actually storing all files containing the specific keyword and 2) the
corresponding proofs of storage are computed only on these files (during an audit).
3.3 Our Approach
To achieve the guarantees mentioned above, we let the server store the inverted index (in the form
of a lookup table) in an authenticated fashion which makes the exact set of file-identifiers (match-
ing a particular keyword) returned by the server verifiable. Moreover, for each file outsourced
to the server, the client embeds its file-identifier fid in the authenticator tags computed on the
segments of the file. This ensures that the server responds with the proofs of storage computed
on exactly those files that contain the particular keyword.
During an audit in a KDPoS scheme (see Definition 3), the verifier can perform either a file-
identifier-based audit (on a set of files) or a keyword-based audit (on the set of all files containing
a particular keyword). For a file-identifier-based audit, the verifier selects a set of file-identifiers
f˜id and generates a random challenge set Q for f˜id. Then, she sends f˜id and Q to the server,
and the server computes proofs of storage based on these inputs. The verifier verifies the proofs
with respect to f˜id and Q.
On the other hand, for a keyword-based audit, the verifier cannot generate the random challenge
set Q for a keyword w as she does not know a priori the set of file-identifiers f˜id matching w. One
trivial way to resolve this issue is the following. The verifier sends the keyword w to the server,
and the server sends the corresponding f˜id (with an authentication proof) to the verifier. Then,
the verifier generates Q (using the procedure SChallenge) and sends it to the server. However,
this solution increases the number of communication rounds between the verifier and the server.
Another probable solution is to generate Q in a non-interactive fashion such that both the server
and the verifier, given some randomness r, can produce the same challenge set Q. However, this
randomness r used to generate Q must be non-precomputable by the server (and also verifiable
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by the verifier); otherwise, a malicious server might manipulate r to get Q of its choice in order
to pass a keyword-based audit. We describe a non-interactive challenge-generation method used
in our KDPoS construction as follows.
Non-interactive Challenge Generation for Keyword-Based Audits Armknecht et al. [1]
use a time-dependent pseudo-randomness generator GetRandomness : T → {0, 1}lseed with an
access to a secure time-dependent source, where T denotes a set of discrete timestamps and
lseed = O(λ). Let cur denote the current timestamp. Given a timestamp t ∈ T , the generator
GetRandomness outputs a uniform random string in {0, 1}lseed if t ≤ cur; otherwise, it outputs
⊥. Armknecht et al. instantiate GetRandomness by using Bitcoin (see Section 2.6) as a secure
time-dependent source to achieve unpredictability of the output string. For a timestamp t ∈ T ,
GetRandomness outputs the hash of the first block appended to the Bitcoin blockchain after t.
Given t, this pseudorandom output string can be generated (and verified) by anyone. Although
the original scheme [1] uses this method in order to protect an honest party (among the client,
the cloud server and the third-party auditor) in case the other parties collude, this method works
well for non-interactive challenge generation in our KDPoS scheme also (during keyword-based
audits).
Given the pseudorandom string output by GetRandomness, the challenge set Q can be gener-
ated in a similar way as described in [22,25]. The underlying idea is that the client sends to the
server the current timestamp t as a part of a challenge. The server generates Q based on t and
sends proofs of storage to the client. The client follows the same procedure to generate Q from t
and verifies the proofs sent by the server. We describe the method in details for keyword-based
audits (comprising the procedures KChallenge, KProve and KVerify) in our scheme.
4 Our KDPoS Construction
We use the publicly verifiable POR scheme for static data proposed by Shacham and Waters [26]
as the underlying proof-of-storage scheme, and modify the same in order to support keyword-based
audits. Our keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol (KDPoS) consists of the following
procedures.
– Setup(1λ): Let the algorithm BLSetup(1λ) output (p, g,G,GT , e) as the parameters of a bi-
linear map, where G and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p = Θ(2
2λ), g is a
generator ofG (i.e., G = 〈g〉) and e : G×G→ GT (see Section 2.2). The client chooses a random
element x
R
←− Zp and sets v = g
x. Let α
R
←− G be another generator ofG andH : {0, 1}∗ → G be
the BLS hash [5] modeled as a random oracle [4]. Let H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}⌈log2 p⌉ be a (pub-
lic) cryptographic hash function. Let F be the space of file-identifiers. Let GetRandomness
be a time-dependent pseudo-randomness generator as described in Section 3.3. For a given
timestamp t ∈ T , GetRandomness outputs the hash of the first block appended to the Bitcoin
blockchain after t. Let (ssk, psk) be the pair of signing and verification keys for a secure digital
signature scheme S (see Section 2.7). The secret key of the client is sk = (x, ssk), the public
key is pk = (v, psk, α).
– Outsource(F¯ , sk, fid): Let the set of n¯f data files the client wants to outsource to the server
be F¯ = {F1, F2, . . . , Fn¯f }. Let the file-identifiers corresponding to these files form the set
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fid = {fid1, fid2, . . . , fidn¯f }, where each of these file-identifiers is drawn from the space
F uniformly at random. The space F must be large enough (e.g., Zp) such that each file is
associated with a distinct file-identifier except with a negligible probability.
For each file F ∈ F¯ , the client extracts the keywords present in F . Let W be the set of all
distinct keywords present in any of these files. The client builds a lookup table TL such that,
for each keyword w ∈ W , the row indexed by the keyword w contains an ordered list Lw of
file-identifiers matching w. For each row indexed by w ∈W , the client computes a signature
γw = S.Sign(ssk,w||Lw) (1)
and appends this signature γw to Lw present in that row. Let nw be the number of file-identifiers
present in Lw. Then, the row indexed by w is of the form
fidi1 ||fidi2 || · · · ||fidinw ||γw
for some i1, i2, . . . , inw ∈ [1, n¯f ]. We note that each signature γw authenticates the binding
between the exact list (Lw) of file-identifiers matching w and the corresponding keyword w.
For each i ∈ [1, n¯f ], the client performs the following.
• The client encodes Fi with an erasure code to form another file F
′
i with ni segments, where
mij = F
′
i [j] ∈ Zp for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ni.
• For all 1 ≤ j ≤ ni, the client computes an authentication tag on the j-th segment as
σij = (H(fidi||j) · α
mij )x ∈ G. (2)
Let Γi = {σi1, σi2, . . . , σini} be the ordered list of authentication tags for F
′
i .
Finally, the client uploads F¯ ′ = ({(F ′i , Γi, fidi, ni)}1≤i≤n¯f , TL) to the cloud server. The client
stores d¯ = {(fidi, ni)}1≤i≤n¯f at her end in order to check the integrity of some of these files
later.
– AuthRead(j, F¯ ′, d¯, pk, fid): When the client wants to read the j-th block of a file F ′ iden-
tified by fid, the server sends to the client F ′[j], the j-th block of the file, along with its
authentication tag σ.
– VerifyRead(j, d¯, pk, sk, F ′[j], σ, fid): After receiving the pair (F ′[j], σ) from the server, the
client checks whether
σ
?
= (H(fid||j) · αF
′[j])x ∈ G. (3)
The client outputs 1 if the equality holds; she outputs 0, otherwise.
– SChallenge(pk, l, d¯): During a file-identifier-based audit, the verifier selects an ordered list
of file-identifiers f˜id to be challenged. For each fidi present in f˜id, the verifier generates a
random challenge set Qi = {(rj , νj)}i of cardinality l = λ, where each rj
R
←− [1, ni] and each
νj
R
←− Zp. The verifier sends f˜id and Q = {{(rj , νj)}i}fidi∈f˜id to the server.
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– SProve(Q, pk, l, F¯ ′, f˜id): For each fidi ∈ f˜id, the server computes a pair (σi, µi), where
σi =
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
σirj
νj ∈ G,
µi =
∑
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
νjmirj mod p ∈ Zp.
(4)
The server sends T = {(σi, µi)}fidi∈f˜id to the verifier.
– SVerify(Q,T, pk, l, d¯): For each fidi ∈ f˜id, the verifier checks whether the equality
e(σi, g)
?
= e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi , v

 (5)
holds or not. The verifier outputs 1 if all the equalities hold; otherwise, she outputs 0.
– KChallenge(pk, l, w, d¯): During a keyword-based audit for a given keyword w, the verifier
chooses two random strings s0 and s1 each of size λ bits. She also chooses the current timestamp
t. Finally, she constructs a token tw = w||s0||s1||t. The challenge set Q is null. The verifier
sends the token tw to the server.
– KProve(Q, pk, l, F¯ ′, tw): Initially, the challenge set Q is null. The server parses the token tw
as w||s0||s1||t. Given the keyword w, the server fetches TL[w] containing the ordered list Lw of
matching file-identifiers and the corresponding signature γw = S.Sign(ssk,w||Lw). Given the
timestamp t, the server computes the pseudorandom string strt = GetRandomness(t).
Let f˜id = Lw. For each fidi ∈ f˜id, the challenge set Qi = {(rj , νj)}i of cardinality l = λ is
generated as
∀j ∈ Zl : rj = H1(strt||fidi||j||s0) mod ni + 1, [since rj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ni}]
νj = H1(strt||fidi||j||s1) mod p.
For each fidi ∈ f˜id, the server computes a pair (σi, µi), where
σi =
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
σirj
νj ∈ G,
µi =
∑
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
νjmirj mod p ∈ Zp.
(6)
The server sends T = (TL[w], {(σi, µi)}fidi∈f˜id) to the verifier.
– KVerify(Q,T, pk, l, tw, d¯): Initially, the set Q is null. The verifier parses tw as w||s0||s1||t
and T as as (TL[w], {(σi, µi)}fidi∈Lw). She verifies the validity of the signature γw by checking
whether
S.Verify(psk,w||Lw, γw)
?
= accept. (7)
If the verification outputs reject, the verifier outputs 0. Otherwise, the verifier proceeds as
follows.
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Given the timestamp t, the verifier computes strt = GetRandomness(t). Let f˜id = Lw. For
each fidi ∈ f˜id, the challenge set Qi = {(rj , νj)}i of cardinality l = λ is generated as
∀j ∈ Zl : rj = H1(strt||fidi||j||s0) mod ni + 1,
νj = H1(strt||fidi||j||s1) mod p.
For each fidi ∈ f˜id, the verifier checks whether the equality
e(σi, g)
?
= e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi , v

 (8)
holds or not. The verifier outputs 1 if all the equalities hold; otherwise, she outputs 0.
Observations We make the following observations regarding our KDPoS construction.
– We note that the verifier in our KDPoS construction can schedule an audit in a future time
when she is supposed to be offline. This can be done by setting the timestamp t in future. We
recall that, for a timestamp t, GetRandomness outputs the hash of the first Bitcoin block ap-
pended to the Bitcoin blockchain after t. Therefore, it is not possible for the server to compute
the pseudorandom output of GetRandomness(t) unless the current time cur t. Thus, the server
can generate the challenge set Q (which is derived from the output of GetRandomness(t)) only
after time t. On the other hand, if the verifier sends a random seed to the server for an audit
scheduled in a future time t, the (possibly malicious) server can compute the challenge set Q
(and also the proof of storage) immediately after getting the request, modify parts of the file
and send the proof after the specified time t.
– The random challenge set Q used in file-identifier-based audits (involving the procedures
SChallenge, SProve and SVerify) can also be generated in a non-interactive fashion similar
to that used in keyword-based audits. This non-interactive (and verifiable) generation of ran-
dom challenge set Q reduces the overall communication between the verifier and the server
(as the verifier need not send Q to the server).
– We have used techniques (such as building an authenticated lookup table TL over keywords
present in data files, and generating the random challenge set Q with the help of the Bitcoin
blockchain) on top of a particular POR scheme [26] in order to construct a KDPoS scheme.
We note that these techniques are independent of the underlying POR scheme and do not
modify the same. Thus, we can integrate our techniques with any existing publicly verifiable
POR/PDP scheme for static data (which is based on spot-checking random locations of a file)
to obtain such a KDPoS construction.
Correctness of Verification Eqn. 5 and Eqn. 8 (and Eqn. 7) For an honest server correctly
storing all the challenged segments and their corresponding authentication tags for a file identified
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by fidi, we have
σi =
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
σirj
νj
=
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
(H(fidi||rj) · α
mirj )νjx
=

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj ·
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
ανjmirj


x
=

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · α
∑
(rj,νj )∈Qi
νjmirj


x
=

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi


x
.
Substituting the value of σi in e(σi, g), we get
e(σi, g) = e



 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi


x
, g


= e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi , gx


= e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi , v

 .
On the other hand, correctness of Eqn. 7 directly follows from Eqn. 1 and the correctness property
of S (correctness of a digital signature scheme is discussed in Section 2.7). Therefore, the proofs
provided by an honest server always pass the verification Eqn. 5, Eqn. 8 and Eqn. 7.
5 Security
A keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol (KDPoS) must satisfy the following proper-
ties. The formal security definition of a KDPoS scheme is given later in this section.
1. Authenticity The authenticity requirements are twofold. First, the cloud server must pro-
duce proofs of storage computed exactly on the challenged files for file-identifier-based audits
(and proofs of storage computed exactly on the files matching the challenged keyword in case
of keyword-based audits). Second, the cloud server cannot produce valid proofs during audits
without correctly storing the challenged segments of those files and their respective authenti-
cation information.
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2. Retrievability The retrievability property requires that, given a probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A that can respond correctly to a challenge Q with some non-negligible prob-
ability, there exists a polynomial-time extractor algorithm E that can extract (at least) the
challenged segments of the challenged files (or the challenged segments of the files containing
the challenged keyword) by performing file-identifier-based audits (or keyword-based audits)
with A for a polynomial (in λ) number of times. The algorithm E has a rewinding access to A.
The authenticity property restricts the adversary A to produce, during these interactions, valid
responses (without storing these segments of the challenged files) only with some probability
negligible in λ.
5.1 Security Model
We describe the following security game between the challenger (acting as the client) and the
adversary (acting as the cloud server).
– The challenger generates a secret key-public key pair and gives the public key to the adversary.
The adversary selects a set of files F¯ associated with a set of file-identifiers fid to store. The
challenger processes F¯ to form another set of files F¯ ′ and returns F¯ ′ to the adversary. The
adversary stores F¯ ′ at its end. The challenger stores only some metadata d¯ for verification
purpose.
– The adversary adaptively chooses and sends to the challenger a sequence of operations defined
by {opi}1≤i≤q (q is a polynomial in the security parameter λ), where opi is an authenticated
read or an audit. The challenger executes these operations on the file stored by the adver-
sary. An audit request can be for either a file-identifier-based audit or a keyword-based audit,
where the set of files f˜id ⊆ fid or the keyword is chosen by the adversary. For each audit,
the challenger executes an audit on the designated files stored by the adversary (using SChal-
lenge, SProve and SVerify for a file-identifier-based audit, or using KChallenge, KProve and
KVerify for a keyword-based audit). The challenger lets the adversary know the result of each
verification (i.e., the output of VerifyRead or the output of SVerify or the output of KVerify).
– Let F¯ ∗ be the final state of the set of files initially outsourced to the adversary after q opera-
tions. Finally, the challenger executes an audit protocol (file-identifier-based or keyword-based)
with the adversary as follows. The challenger chooses a set of file-identifiers (or a token for a
keyword chosen by the challenger) and sends them along with a random challenge set Q to the
adversary, and the adversary returns a cryptographic proof to the challenger. The adversary
wins the game if it passes the verification.
Definition 4 (Security of a KDPoS Scheme). A keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage
protocol is secure if, given any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can win the secu-
rity game mentioned above with some non-negligible probability, there exists a polynomial-time
extractor algorithm E that can extract, except with some probability negligible in λ, (at least) the
challenged segments of the files (that are challenged via file-identifier-based/keyword-based audits)
by interacting with A polynomially many times.
5.2 Security Analysis of Our KDPoS Scheme
We have described the security model of a keyword-based delegable proof-of-storage protocol
(KDPoS) in Section 5.1. In this section, we state and prove the following theorem in order to prove
14
that our KDPoS construction described in Section 4 is secure in this security model. Our scheme
is secure in the random oracle model [4] under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption
over G = 〈g〉 (see Section 2.4). We note that the fraction of the file-segments retrievable by the
extractor algorithm E interacting with the adversary A (in Definition 4) depends on the underlying
proof-of-storage scheme used. If the underlying scheme is a PDP scheme, E can retrieve at least
the challenged file-segments. On the other hand, if the underlying scheme is a POR scheme (as in
our KDPoS construction), E can retrieve all the segments of the files.
Theorem 1. Given that the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G and the under-
lying digital signature scheme is secure, the KDPoS scheme described in Section 4 is secure in the
random oracle model according to Definition 4.
Proof. We use the following claim in order to prove Theorem 1.
Claim 1 Given that the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G and the underlying
digital signature scheme is secure, the authenticity of the challenged file-segments is guaranteed in
the random oracle model.
Proof. We prove that the following properties required for authenticity hold in our KDPoS scheme.
First, the adversary A must produce proofs of storage computed exactly on the challenged files
for file-identifier-based audits (and proofs of storage computed exactly on the files matching the
challenged keyword in case of keyword-based audits). Second, A cannot produce valid proofs
during audits without correctly storing the challenged segments of those files and their respective
authentication information. We prove these two properties in Part I and Part II, respectively.
Part I During a keyword-based audit for a given keyword w, let the correct content of the row
TL[w] be the ordered list Lw of file-identifiers matching w and the corresponding signature γw =
S.Sign(ssk,w||Lw). Now, if the adversaryA can produce a valid signature γ
′
w = S.Sign(ssk,w||L
′
w)
for a different list L′w (6= Lw) of file-identifiers for the same keyword w, it breaks the security of
the signature scheme (see Section 2.7 for the security definition of a signature scheme). However,
as the underlying signature scheme S used in our KDPoS scheme is assumed to be secure, A
can forge such a signature only with a negligible probability. Thus, similar to a file-identifier-
based audit, the challenger knows the exact file-identifiers on which the keyword-based audit is
being performed. We note that, for each file stored by the adversary, the unique file-identifier
is embedded in the authentication tags corresponding to all segments of that file (see Eqn. 2
in Section 4). Therefore, once the challenger knows the exact file-identifiers on which an audit
(keyword-based/file-identifier-based) is being performed, it is not possible for the adversary to
generate proofs of storage computed on other files without being detected, except with a negligible
probability (this follows from the proof described in Part II).
Part II We refer [26] for the detailed proof. Here, we provide a brief sketch of the same. The basic
idea of the proof is as follows. We assume that, if possible, the adversary A produces valid proofs
(i.e., they pass the verification) during an audit without correctly storing the challenged segments
and their respective authentication information. Then, we can construct another probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm B which can solve problems that are assumed to be hard in G = 〈g〉.
Without loss of generality, we assume that A produces a valid (but incorrect) proof (σ′i, µ
′
i) for a
particular file fidi ∈ f˜id challenged with Qi = {(rj , νj)}i. Let (σi, µi) be the correct proof (i.e.,
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computed honestly) corresponding to the same challenge set Qi = {(rj , νj)}i for fidi. Now, we
consider the following two cases based on whether σi is equal to σ
′
i.
Case I: Let σi 6= σ
′
i. As both of the proofs (σi, µi) and (σ
′
i, µ
′
i) pass the verification, we have
e(σi, g) = e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi , v

 (9)
and
e(σ′i, g) = e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµ
′
i , v

 . (10)
We observe that if µi = µ
′
i, then σi = σ
′
i. So, µi 6= µ
′
i. We define ∆µ = µ
′
i − µi 6= 0.
Let the algorithm B be given with g, ga, h = gb ∈ G for some a, b
R
←− Zp. The goal of B
is to compute ha ∈ G (i.e., to break the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption over G
described in Section 2.4). B sets the public key v = ga and simulates the random oracle H
as follows. For any random oracle query made by the adversary A, the algorithm B chooses a
random r˜
R
←− Zp and responds with g
r˜ ∈ G. For queries of the form H(fidi||u), the algorithm
B chooses random values β, φ
R
←− Zp and sets α = g
β · hφ (during preprocessing the file
identified by fidi as per A’s request). For each u ∈ [1, ni], B chooses a random r˜u
R
←− Zp, sets
H(fidi||u) = g
r˜u/(gβmiu · hφmiu) and computes σiu = (H(fidi||u) · α
miu)a = (ga)r˜u .
Dividing Eqn. 10 by Eqn. 9, we get
e(σ′i/σi, g) = e
(
α∆µ , v
)
=⇒ e(σ′i · σ
−1
i , g) = e
(
gβ∆µ · hφ∆µ , v
)
=⇒ e(σ′i · σ
−1
i , g) = e
(
g, vβ∆µ
)
· e
(
hφ∆µ , v
)
=⇒ e(σ′i · σ
−1
i · v
−β∆µ , g) = e (h, v)φ∆µ
=⇒ e(σ′i · σ
−1
i · v
−β∆µ , g) = e (ha, g)φ∆µ [since v = ga]
=⇒ ha = (σ′i · σ
−1
i · v
−β∆µ)
1
φ∆µ .
Now, the value of φ∆µ is zero with probability 1/p that is negligible in the security parameter
λ (as ∆µ 6= 0 and φ
R
←− Zp). Thus, B breaks the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption
over G.
Case II: From Case I, we know that σi must be equal to σ
′
i. We define ∆µ = µ
′
i − µi 6= 0
(otherwise, if µi = µ
′
i, then two proofs are equal). Let the algorithm B be given with g, h =
ga ∈ G, where a
R
←− Zp. The goal of B is to compute a (i.e., to break the discrete logarithm
assumption over G described in Section 2.3). When A requests for storing the file identified
by fidi, the algorithm B chooses random values β, φ
R
←− Zp and computes the tags taking α
16
as gβ · hφ. Since σi = σ
′
i, we get
e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi , v

 = e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµ
′
i , v


from Eqn. 9 and Eqn. 10. This implies αµi = αµ
′
i =⇒ 1 = α∆µ =⇒ 1 = (gβ ·hφ)∆µ =⇒ h =
g
−
β∆µ
φ∆µ . Now, the value of φ∆µ is zero with probability 1/p that is negligible in the security
parameter λ (as ∆µ 6= 0 and φ
R
←− Zp). Finally, B outputs a = −
β∆µ
φ∆µ
as the discrete logarithm
of h in G = 〈g〉 (thus, B breaks the discrete logarithm assumption over G).
We note that the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in G implies the hardness
of the discrete logarithm problem in G. This completes the proof of Claim 1. 
We describe the extraction procedure for a single encoded file F ′i identified by fidi. The
procedure works for each challenged file identified by fid ∈ f˜id.2 We define a polynomial-time
extractor algorithm E that can extract all segments of F ′i (except with negligible probability)
by interacting with an adversary A that wins the security game described in Section 5.1 with
some non-negligible probability. As our KDPoS scheme satisfies the authenticity property, the
adversary A cannot produce a valid proof (σi, µi) for a given challenge set Qi without storing
the challenged segments of F ′i and their corresponding tags properly, except with some negligible
probability (see Claim 1). This means that if the verification procedure outputs 1 during the
extraction phase, µi is indeed the correct linear combination of the untampered segments (that
is, µi =
∑
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
νjmirj mod p).
Suppose that the extractor algorithm E wants to extract k segments (indexed by J) of the
file F ′i . It challenges A with Qi = {(rj , νj)}rj∈J . If the proof is valid (that is, if the verification
procedure outputs 1), E initializes a matrix ME with [ν1rj ]rj∈J as its first row, where ν1rj = νj
for each rj ∈ J . The extractor challenges A for the same J but with different random coefficients.
If the verification procedure outputs 1 and the vector of coefficients is linearly independent to
the existing rows of ME , then E appends this vector to ME as a row. The extractor algorithm E
runs this procedure until the matrix ME has k number of linearly independent rows. So, the final
form of the full-rank matrix ME is [νurj ]u∈[1,k],rj∈J . Consequently, the challenged segments can be
extracted using Gaussian elimination.
Following the way mentioned above, the extractor algorithm E can interact with A (polyno-
mially many times) in order to extract ρ-fraction of segments (for some ρ) present in the file F ′i
by setting the index set J appropriately. Use of a ρ-rate erasure code ensures retrievability of all
segments of F ′i . This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
6 Efficiency of Our KDPoS Scheme
The efficiency of our KDPoS scheme depends on the underlying POR scheme [26]. For each file
challenged by the verifier, the proof consists of a pair of the form (σ, µ) that is of size 2 · log2 p
2 For a file-identifier-based challenge, the list f˜id of file-identifiers is already known. On the other hand, for a
keyword-based challenge, the correct list f˜id of file-identifiers matching a particular keyword is obtained initially
(see Part I of Claim 1). Then, file-identifier-based challenges are used to extract all the segments of each file
identified by fid ∈ f˜id. So, the extraction procedures for these two types of challenges are almost same.
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bits, where σ ∈ G, µ ∈ Zp and p = Θ(2
2λ). For example, such a pair is 64 bytes long for 128-bit
security (i.e., λ = 128). On the other hand, for each challenged file, the verifier needs to compute 2
pairings along with other operations (l+1 exponentiations and one multiplication in G). However,
we later describe a method in order to make both of these parameters independent of the number
of files being audited (see Section 6.4).
6.1 Storage Overhead
We have described our KDPoS scheme assuming that an authentication tag (an element of G) is
generated for each segment (an element of Zp) of a file. Therefore, the storage overhead (for the
tags) is same as the storage itself. This can be mitigated by grouping s segments as a single chunk
and computing an authentication tag for each of these chunks [26]. Thus, the storage overhead is
1/s-fraction of the storage. However, during an audit, the size of the aggregated segment (µ) sent
by the server as a proof is now s · log2 p bits. In addition, we have introduced an authenticated
lookup table TL in order to enable keyword-based audits. LetW be the set of all distinct keywords
present in any file F ∈ F¯ and nw be the number of files containing a keyword w ∈ W . Let bS be
the size (in bits) of a signature in S and bF be the number of bits required to represent the space
of file-identifiers F . Then, the storage overhead incurred for storing TL is
∑
w∈W (nw · bF + bS)
bits.
6.2 Efficient Search over Lookup Table
In order to enable the server to search over the lookup table TL efficiently, the client builds a
dictionary data structure (e.g., trie, hash table, self-balancing binary search tree) over all distinct
keywords in W (during the procedure Outsource). The node in this data structure corresponding
to a keyword w contains Lw||γw, where Lw is the ordered list of file-identifiers matching w and
γw = S.Sign(ssk,w||Lw). Then, the client uploads this data structure along with the processed
files to the server. Now, the server makes an efficient search to find the exact node corresponding
to the keyword challenged during a keyword-based audit.
6.3 Communication Complexity
In case of a keyword-based audit, the server sends to the verifier the row of TL indexed by w
(containing the list of file-identifiers matching w) along with the corresponding proofs of storage
(during the procedure KProve). We note that for a file-identifier-based audit as well, the verifier
sends a list of file-identifiers along with the challenge set (during the procedure SChallenge).
Therefore, the overall communication complexity is of the same order for both types of audits.
Moreover, the challenge set Q can be generated in a non-interactive way (for both types of audits)
eliminating the need for communicating the same.
6.4 Proof Generation and Verification in a Batch
We observe that given a list of file-identifiers f˜id and a challenge set Q = {{(rj , νj)}i}fidi∈f˜id,
the server computes a pair (σi, µi) for each fidi ∈ f˜id (see Eqn. 4 and Eqn. 6). Therefore, the
corresponding proof T consists of |f˜id| pairs of the form (σ, µ), where σ ∈ G and µ ∈ Zp. Hence,
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the proof size is |T | = 2 · |f˜id| · log2 p bits. On the other hand, for each fidi ∈ f˜id, the verifier
checks whether the following equality
e(σi, g)
?
= e

 ∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµi , v

 (11)
holds or not (see Eqn. 5 and Eqn. 8). Therefore, the verifier needs to perform expensive pairing
operations for 2 · |f˜id| times.
To reduce both the size of the proof and the number of pairing operations required to verify
a proof, we adopt an idea similar to that of aggregating the challenged segments and their cor-
responding tags for a single file. We observe that, for each challenged file identified by fidi in
our KDPoS scheme, the server aggregates all the challenged segments into a single segment µi
and all the corresponding tags into a single tag σi (see Eqn. 4 and Eqn. 6), and the verifier runs
the verification procedure on the aggregated segment and the aggregated tag (see Eqn. 11). We
extend this simple idea for multiple files (that are present in f˜id) as follows. During the proof
generation procedure, the server computes a pair (σ, µ), where
σ =
∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
σirj
νj =
∏
fidi∈f˜id
σi ∈ G
and
µ =
∑
fidi∈f˜id
∑
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
νjmirj mod p =
∑
fidi∈f˜id
µi mod p ∈ Zp.
Given the aggregated segment µ and the aggregated tag σ, the verifier checks if
e(σ, g)
?
= e

 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµ, v

 . (12)
In this case, the reduced proof size is |T | = 2 · log2 p bits, and the verifier needs to perform
only 2 pairing operations. It is important to note that both of these parameters are now constant,
irrespective of the number of files involved in either a file-identifier-based audit or a keyword-based
audit.
Correctness of Verification Eqn. 12 For an honest server storing all the challenged segments
and their corresponding authentication tags (for each file identified by fidi ∈ f˜id) correctly, we
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have
σ =
∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
σirj
νj
=
∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
(H(fidi||rj) · α
mirj )νjx
=

 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj ·
∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
α
νjmirj


x
=

 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj ·
∏
fidi∈f˜id
α
∑
(rj,νj )∈Qi
νjmirj


x
=

 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj ·
∏
fidi∈f˜id
αµi


x
=

 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · α
∑
fidi∈f˜id
µi


x
=

 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµ


x
.
Substituting the value of σ in e(σ, g), we get
e(σ, g) = e



 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµ


x
, g


= e

 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµ, gx


= e

 ∏
fidi∈f˜id
∏
(rj ,νj)∈Qi
H(fidi||rj)
νj · αµ, v

 .
7 Conclusion
In this work, we have introduced keyword-based delegable proofs of storage, where the data
owner (or a third-party auditor) can selectively check the integrity of all her data files containing
a particular keyword. We have formally defined the security of a keyword-based delegable proof-of-
storage protocol. We have provided a construction of an efficient keyword-based delegable proof-
of-storage protocol and analyzed the security of our construction. Any existing publicly verifiable
proof-of-storage scheme (based on spot-checking techniques) can be extended in a similar fashion
as described in this work. We have also discussed the efficiency of our construction and some
possible ways to enhance this efficiency.
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